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ADMINISTRATION OF A DECEASED
WIFE'S INTEREST IN COMMUNITY
ASSETS
Jerry A. Kasner*
Modern estate planning practice, emphasizing a minimization
of death taxes and probate costs, often discourages the traditional
legacy of property by one spouse to the other. Property so passing
may be subjected to probate and taxation twice within a short period
of time.' To prevent this, a surviving spouse may be given only a
limited life interest, if any at all, in the estate of the deceased spouse,
with the bulk of the beneficial interest passing to succeeding generations.2 Often the use of the trust device to carry out such a plan
results in the selection of independent trustees and executors to
achieve certain tax advantages and to provide continuity in the administration of estate assets.
This form of planning for the "splitting" of interest between
husband and wife necessarily results in division of the community
property upon the death of either. If the husband dies first there
are few administrative problems of special significance because the
entire community estate is subject to probate administration and
jurisdiction.8 If, however, the wife dies first, the husband's continued
management of the community, together with probate administration of her interest in the community estate, produce unusual problems and situations which will be discussed in this article.
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF A WIFE'S TESTAMENTARY POWER
OVER HER INTEREST IN THE COMMUNITY ESTATE

The evolution of the wife's right to make a testamentary disposition of her interest in the community may be considered in terms
of the following periods:
1. Pre-1850. The courts relied upon an interpretation of Spanish community property law to the effect that upon the wife's prior
* B.S., 1955, J.D., 1957, Drake University; C.P.A., 1959; Member, California and
Iowa Bars. Assistant Professor, School of Law, University of Santa Clara.
I RICE, FAMILY TAX PLANNING 84 (1962).
2 HARRIS, FAMILY ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE § 106, at 248 (1957);
CUSAK, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF ESTATE PLANNING 336 (1961).
3 CAL. PROB. CODE, § 202.
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death her interest remained an expectancy until the death of her
succeeded to one-half of whatever
husband, at which time her heirs
4
was then left in the community.
2. 1850-1861. The interest of each spouse in the community
passed upon death to the heirs of that spouse.'
3. 1861-1923. The wife's interest in the community passed to
her husband without probate; therefore she had no testamentary
power except in situations involving divorce or separation.6
4. 1923-1927. The wife had testamentary power over her
limited7 interest in the community, comparable to a power of appointment.

5. 1927-Present.The wife has, in addition to the testamentary
power she obtained in 1923, the "present, existing, and equal rights"
she obtained in 1927.8
Although the 1923 amendment to section 1401 of the Civil
Code, now section 201 of the Probate Code, purported to give each
spouse an equal power to make a testamentary disposition of his or
her interest in the community, which otherwise would pass to the
surviving spouse, there are substantial differences in the treatment
of their interests. When the husband dies, the entire community is
subject to administration, regardless of whether he exercised his
power of testamentary disposition.9 When the wife dies, not only
does the husband's interest in the community vest in him without
administration, but also any of the wife's interest which she did
not dispose of by her will.1 ° Prior to 1927 this preferential treatment
of the husband was consistent with the idea that he was effectively
the owner of the community, subject only to the wife's testamentary
power. But it seems clear that since 1927 the portion of the wife's
interest in the community not disposed of by her will passes to the
surviving husband only by reason of descent or succession. 1
4 Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal. 488 (1851).

5 Cal. Stats. 1850, ch. 103, p. 255, § 11.
6 Cal. Stats. 1861, ch. 323, pp. 310, 311, § 1; Cal. Stats. 1863-64, ch. 333, p. 363,
§ 1; CAL. CIV. CODE (1872) § 1401 amended Code. Am. 1873-74, ch. 612, p. 238, § 181.
7 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1401, as amended by Stats. 1923, ch. 18, p. 29, § 1, now CAL.
PROB. CODE § 201; Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 7 Pac. 1003 (1932) ; Riley v.
Gordon, 137 Cal. App. 311, 30 P.2d 617 (1934).
8 CAL. CIV. CODE § 161a, added by Cal. Stats. 1927, ch. 265, p. 484, § 1.
9 Estate of Coffee, 19 Cal. 2d 248, 120 P.2d 661 (1941).
10 Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal. App. 2d 681, 189 P.2d 528 (1948); 1 CONDEE, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE, Probate Court Practice § 31 at 20 (1955).
11 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Siegel, 250 F.2d 339 (1957); Kelley
Estate, 122 Cal. App. 2d 42, 264 P.2d 210 (1953); Estate of Piatt, 81 Cal. App. 2d
348, 183 P.2d 919 (1947) ; Estate of King, 19 Cal. 2d 354, 121 P.2d 716 (1942).
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THE EXTENT OF A SURVIVING HUSBAND'S CONTROL, POSSESSION AND
USE OF THE COMMUNITY ESTATE:

Knego v. Grover

The establishment in 1923 of the wife's testamentary power
over her share of the community was accompanied by amendments
to section 1402 of the Civil Code, which survive substantially unchanged as sections 202 and 203 of the Probate Code. The first portion of Prob. C. 20212 establishes the groundwork for administration
of community assets passing from the control of the husband by
reason of his death or by reason of his wife's testamentary disposition. Property so passing will be subject to his debts and to administration in accordance with Division III of the Probate Code.
This general proposition was conditioned by the remaining provisions
of Prob. C. 202 and Prob. C. 203.
The portion of Prob. C. 202 with which we are principally concerned reads as follows:
... but in the event of such testamentary disposition by the wife, the
husband, pending administration, shall retain the same power to sell,
manage and deal with the community personal property as he had during her lifetime, and his possession and control of the community property shall not be transferred to the personal representative of the wife
except to the extent necessary to carry her will into effect.

Prob. C. 203 provides in part as follows:
After 40 days from the death of the wife, the surviving husband shall
have full power to sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise deal with and dispose of the community real property, unless a notice is recorded in the
county in which the property is situated to the effect that an interest in
the property is claimed by another under the wife's will.

There are differences in the wording of the two sections which
may be significant. For example, while Prob. C. 202 grants the
husband power to "manage" personal property, Prob. C. 203 does
not specifically empower the husband to "manage" real property.
Prob. C. 202 allows the husband to deal with the personalty as he
did during the lifetime of his wife, while similar authorization is
not granted him by Prob. C. 203. However, Prob. C. 203 apparently
grants him as much, if not more, control over community realty
than would exist during her lifetime under section 172a of the Civil
Code. Prob. C. 203 empowers the husband to "dispose" of community realty, while Prob. C. 202 does not. But Prob. C. 202 does
grant him the same power over community personalty that he had
12 Because of repeated citations to particular sections of the California Codes in
the text of this article, the author is adopting the following familiar abbreviations:
Cal. Prob. Code-Prob. C.
Cal. Civ. Code-C. C.
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during her lifetime, and under section 172 of the Civil Code this
would include the absolute power of disposition.
The Probate Code sections quoted above were taken almost
verbatim from former C.C. 1402. When these sections were combined in the Civil Code, they presented a logical definition of powers
and limitations. It would seem reasonable to construe the two
sections together, and conclude that there is no essential distinction
in the husband's control over community realty and personalty
unless a 40 day notice is filed, cutting off his power to deal with
realty."
Not until 1962 did a California court in Knego v. Grover" give
us the first definitive interpretation of the nature and extent of the
powers conferred upon a surviving husband by Prob. C. 202 and
203.
The code sections in question must be interpreted as part of the total law
governing the wife's right to make a testamentary disposition of her
share in the community property; defining the extent of that share
for testamentary purposes; prescribing a procedure governing the time
and method by which it may be subjected to administration for such
purposes; retaining in the husband a form of management of the
community personal property essential to the use of his interest
therein; also retaining in him control and possession of all the community property, restricted only to the extent necessary to carry into
effect the provisions of his wife's will, for the evident purpose of enabling him to preserve in the fullest measure commensurate with testamentary disposition both his and his wife's interest therein; providing
a method whereby the beneficiaries under a wife's will may give notice
of their claim to an interest in community real property under control
of the husband; and protecting those who deal with him concerning
the same where such notice has not been given. 15

Prior to this decision little authority existed to guide practitioners
in this area, and one author was led to observe that "Some day
some lawyer will get some real high-powered litigation on this subject and make us some law."' 6 It appears his hope has been realized.
The few cases before Knego which touched upon the rights of the
surviving husband presented a picture of conflict and inconsistency.
In Makeig v. United Security Bank and Trust Company17 the
surviving husband sued the executor of his wife's will to recover
certain bank deposits which he contended were community property.
The court found that part of these accounts were community in
'3

14
15
16
17

Wilson v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 2d 592, 225 P.2d 1001 (1951).
208 Cal. App. 2d 134, 25 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1962).
Id. at 144-45, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65.
1 CONDEE, op. cit. supra note 10, § 922.
112 Cal. App. 138, 296 Pac. 673 (1931).
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nature, but ordered the executor to pay over only one-half to the
surviving husband. Answering the argument that the husband was
entitled to possession and control of all community assets under
section 1402 of the Civil Code, (now Prob. C. 202) the court commented:
While Section 1402 of the said Code provides that possession and control of the community property shall not be transferred to the personal
representative of the wife except to the extent necessary to carry the
will into effect, in this case where only $10 is bequeathed to the husband
and the entire balance to others, it is without question necessary for
the personal representative of the wife in this case to retain possession
of the amount subject to her testamentary disposition in order to carry
her will into effect, not only to pay her debts, but the costs, charges,
and expenses of administration as well as the legacies. 18

In a later case, 19 a husband asserted a similar claim against the
executrix of his wife's estate, contending certain assets held by the
estate were community property. He argued that, since the wife had
not disposed of any community property by her will, he was the
owner of such property and entitled to its possession. The court held
that the executrix was entitled to possession of all of the decedent's
property. It decided that the probate court had jurisdiction to determine whether the assets were in fact community, and, if so, to order
the assets transferred to the surviving husband. The opinion is
extremely doubtful as to the probate court's jurisdiction to determine
title to assets.2 ° The case is not directly in point in view of the fact
the wife had not exercised her testamentary power over community
assets. However, this decision is significant because of its broad
interpretation of the personal representative's power over assets,
community and separate, under Prob. C. 300 and 571.
A third decision more directly in point was Wilson v. Superior
Court.2' The husband and executor were litigating the question of
whether an apartment house was community property or separate
property of the deceased wife. The executor contended that, even
if the property were community, he was entitled to possession. The
court rejected this contention, relying on both Prob. C. 202 and 203.
It followed a construction of Prob. C. 202 to the effect that the
surviving husband retained management powers even though administration was pending as to one-half of the community assets
under the wife's will. 2 The court also rejected the executor's argument that, as the bonded representative of the estate, it was entitled
Id. at 145, 296 Pac. at 676.
19 Parsley v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 2d 446, 104 P.2d 1073 (1940).
20 Cf. notes 58-67 and accompanying text, infra.
21 101 Cal. App. 2d 592, 225 P.2d 1001 (1951).
22 The court relied upon 3 CAL. JUR. (Supp. 682).
18
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to possession to prevent waste or appropriation of income from the
property, reasoning that the courts had ample power to protect the
estate.
The Wilson opinion quoted that part of the Makeig decision
quoted above, but limited such reference to the question of jurisdiction of a probate court to try title to real property. These two
decisions are completely inconsistent on the questions of management, possession and control. Although both are based on Prob. C.
202, Makeig concludes that when a wife makes a testamentary
disposition of her interest in the community, that portion so disposed
of must be transferred to her personal representative for administration in order to carry out the provisions of her will. Wilson reaches
an opposite result. A possible distinction is that Makeig involved
easily divisible personal assets, while Wilson involved realty. But
the Wilson opinion makes no such distinction and in fact relies
almost entirely upon Prob. C. 202, which relates primarily to
personal property.
Neither of the above opinions were cited by the court in the
Knego decision. But in accord with Wilson the court did not question
the right of the surviving husband to possess, control and manage the
entire community. Nevertheless, to some extent the rationale of
Makeig seems present in part of the Knego opinion:
... the court had authority to direct the defendant-husband to pay over
to the administrator of his wife's estate that part of the note payments
and the bank account funds in question which were subject to adminisshould
tration, as aforesaid, if it was necessary that the administrator
23
have possession thereof to carry the wife's will into effect.
This indicates the following test: community assets should be
transferred to the wife's estate only when and to the extent necessary
to carry out the testamentary intent of the wife. It is apparent that
the Makeig decision applied the test too broadly, and in so doing
virtually eliminated the powers of the surviving husband under
Prob. C. 202. However, situations may arise in which probate
administration and control over the entire community interest of
the wife might be necessary to carry her will into effect, as when the
husband's continued possession and control would result in waste
or dissipation.
Prob. C. 202 specifically grants the husband the same power
to deal with community personalty he had during his wife's lifetime.
His lifetime power, as defined in C.C. 172, includes an absolute
power of disposition, limited only as to testamentary dispositions,
23

Knego v. Grover, 208 Cal. App. 2d 134, 147, 25 Cal. Rptr. 158, 166 (1962).
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transfers without valuable consideration, and sales of certain
personal chattels. Similar powers to deal with community realty are
granted by Prob. C. 203 and C.C. 172a, except that the wife's consent is required to sales or transfers during her lifetime.
According to one authority California is the only community
property jurisdiction in the United States which grants the husband
such broad powers.2 4 In interpreting the extent of this power as it
existed prior to 1927, Justice Holmes declared that the husband
could spend community funds as he chooses and ". . . if he wastes
it in debauchery the wife has no redress."2 5 While this language
is undoubtedly too strong,2" it is clear that the husband's power
during his wife's lifetime is indeed broad, and includes the power
to expend or consume community assets for personal debts and
expenses.2 7 The "present, existing and equal rights" in the community conferred upon the wife in 1927 did not alter this power.
In Grolemund v. Cafferata s the California Supreme Court held that,
regardless of the equal rights of the wife created by section 161a of
the Civil Code, the enactment of section 172 of the Civil Code
subjected the entire community to "any and all contracts of the
husband."20 He would thus be able to dispose of community assets
in the same manner as he could his separate property, short of
making a gift or transfer without the consent of his wife when
required under C.C. 172 and 172a. Referring to Prob. C. 202, the
court further pointed out that upon the death of either spouse, the
community would be subject to all of the husband's debts. The
principles announced in this decision have never been disputed in
subsequent decisions."
If the husband has the unqualified right to subject the entire
community to his personal debts and expenses during his wife's
lifetime, could he not continue to do so after her death under the
authority of Prob. C. 202? In Panaud v. Jones3 l the California
Supreme Court held that the interests of a deceased wife's heirs
in the community were contingent and defeasible and could be
24 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCrPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 206, at 588-89 (1943).
25 United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. at 327 (1926).
26 In managing the community, the husband has always been characterized as a
fiduciary. Cf. notes 46-48 and accompanying text, infra.
27 CAL. CIV. CODE § 172; Spreckles v. Spreckles, 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228 (1897);
Morris v. Berman, 159 Cal. App. 2d 770, 324 P.2d 601 (1958); Thomasset v. Thomasset, 122 Cal. App. 2d 116, 264 P.2d 626 (1953).
28 17 Cal. 2d 679, 111 P.2d 641 (1941).
29 Id. at 683, 111 P.2d at 644.
30 Odone v. Marzocchi, 34 Cal. 2d 431, 211 P.2d 297 (1949); Brunvold v. Johnson & Co., 59 Cal. App. 2d 75, 138 P.2d 32 (1943) ; Estate of Coffee, 19 Cal. 2d 248,
120 P.2d 661 (1941).
81 1 Cal. 488 (1851).
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perfected only after the death of the husband. The entire community would be subject to all of the debts of the husband, whether
contracted before or after his wife's death. Just over thirty years
later in Johnston v. San Francisco Savings Union82 the same court
held that the community dissolved upon the death of the wife. A
debt subsequently incurred by the husband would not be a charge
against the entire community, although he did have the power to
keep alive a debt incurred before his wife's death.
The obvious inconsistencies in these decisions is due to the fact
Panaud was based upon a pre-1850 interpretation of Spanish community property law which gave the wife or her successors little
more than a bare expectancy in the community until the death of
her husband.3 Johnston, on the other hand, was based upon the 1850
statute, which the court construed as giving the wife an interest in
the community which on her death vested absolutely in her heirs.
In the latter opinion the court indicated that since death dissolves
the community, the surviving husband occupies the status of a surviving, not continuing, partner. As the surviving partner, it would
be his duty to settle the affairs of the community, not to impose new
burdens upon it. He would therefore have the power to manage and
sell community property. These powers would be the same in nature,
though not in extent, as those powers he possessed during the life84
time of his wife. As the court had indicated in a prior decision,
the surviving husband could contract debts of the community for
the "common benefit,"8 which meant debts and obligations necessary to preserve and maintain the community.
Despite the antiquity of the Johnston case and the the pecu-"
liarities of the law at the time it was decided, its rationale was
accepted by the court in the Knego decision as follows: "On the
other hand, the debts of the husband referred to in Section 202 do
not include those incurred by him after his wife's death which have no
relationship to their community property. (See Johnston v. San
.)" The court believed that any other
Francisco Savings Union ...
would enable the husband to frustrate
202
interpretation of Prob. C.
his wife's testamentary intent. It further concluded that the
surviving husband did not have the power to consume his wife's
interest in the community by giving it away or using it to pay debts
other than those relating to the maintenance or preservation of the
82 75 Cal. 134, 16 Pac. 753 (1888).
83 For a criticism of this interpretation of Spanish community property law, see
1 DE FUNIAK, op. cit. supranote 20.
84 Packard v. Arellanes, 17 Cal. 525 (1860).
88 75 Cal. at 145, 16 Pac. at 756.
36 Knego v. Grover, 208 Cal. App. 2d 134, 145, 25 Cal. Rptr. 158, 165 (1962).
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community property. The court compared the husband's status to
that of a trustee. This, of course, is consistent with his status as
manager of the community during the lifetime of his wife, which has
been analogized to that of "a partner, agent or fiduciary 8' 7 and has
resulted in the protection of the wife against fraudulent transfers",
and gross mismanagement. 9 It is certainly reasonable to conclude
that her estate would succeed to the same protection.
The Knego decision also considered other problems and situations which will be developed later in this article. There are many
problems it did not consider, including the effect of the provisions of
section 171c of the Civil Code. This section, enacted in 1951,
developed the principle of dual management of the community
during the lifetime of the spouses. It granted the wife power of
management, control, and disposition of community assets earned
by her or received by her as compensation for personal injuries.
Since Prob. C. 202 grants the surviving husband control over the
entire community, would this control extend to such assets as had
been under the control of his wife during her lifetime? Since Prob.
C. 202 refers to the powers of the husband during the lifetime of his
wife, it might be interpreted as excluding C.C. 17 1c property. However, the status of real property acquired with C.C. 171c property
is certainly not clear, particularly since Prob. C. 203 does not
specifically give to the husband the same powers he had during his
wife's lifetime. Statutory clarification is needed in this area.4 °
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF PROBATE ADMINISTRATION

The remainder of this article will deal with the specific problems
of probate administration of the interest of the deceased wife's
interest in community assets. It is clear that Division III of the
Probate Code dealing with the rights, duties, and liabilities of
personal representatives in the administration of estates, as well as
the jurisdiction and powers of probate courts, made no allowance
for the unusual situations created by Prob. C. 202 and 203. The
problems encountered in the course of such administration are
unique and require careful consideration.
Jurisdiction
Although Prob. C. 300 grants the superior courts sitting in
probate and the personal representatives broad jurisdiction over
87 Fields v. Michael, 91 Cal. App. 2d 443, 205 P.2d 402 (1949).
88 Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 249 Pac. 197 (1926); Estate of Risse, 156

Cal. App. 2d 412, 319 P.2d 789 (1957).
39 Kirby v. San Francisco Savings & Loan Society, 95 Cal. App. 757, 273 Pac. 609
(1928).
40 VERRALL, CASES ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY 288 (1960).
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the property of a decedent, Prob. C. 202 expressly conditions such
jurisdiction upon continuing management and control of community
assets by the surviving husband. This, of course, does not mean that
the surviving husband is not accountable for his activities as manager
of the community." But it does mean that the jurisdiction of the
probate court can be applied only in a manner consistent with the
powers retained by the husband. As a result, problems of jurisdiction
will be considered with reference to specific areas of probate administration.
Appointment of a PersonalRepresentative
The appointment of a personal representative other than the
surviving husband should present no particular problems in this
2
situation, except possibly in cases when a bond will be required.
Since the amount of the bond is based upon the value of the personal
property and the value of probable income from real property
"belonging to the estate,"" the amount should include that portion
of the community assets over which the wife exercised testamentary
power and which are therefore subject to administration under
Prob. C. 202. Though it might be argued that the intent of Prob. C.
541 was to afford protection only to estate assets within the possession and control of the personal representative under section 571
of the Probate Code, no such limitation is suggested in the section's
wording. 4 In any case, the assets will eventually be transferred to
the personal representative to carry the wife's will into effect.
The appointment of the surviving husband as the personal
representative will materially affect his rights and powers, particularly with reference to probate court jurisdiction over him. He
becomes subject to probate court jurisdiction in determining his
interest in the community, even though the community assets are in
his possession as the survivor, not as the personal representative.
He also becomes chargeable in45probate with all community assets
within his posession and control.
Although executors and administrators are fiduciaries, and
subject to the obligations and liabilities of trustees in the broadest
41 Knego v. Grover, 208 Cal. App. 2d 134, 25 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1962).
42 Since we are here concerned with testamentary dispositions, it is very likely
the requirement of a bond would be waived in the provisions of the will. Of course,
the personal representative could be an administrator with the will annexed.
43 CAL. PROB. CODE § 541.
44 Ibid.
45 Estate of Kelpsh, 203 Cal. 613, 265 Pac. 214 (1928) ; Bauer v. Bauer, 201 Cal.
267, 256 Pac. 820 (1927).
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sense of the term,4 6 they are not trustees in the strict legal sense of
the term. 7 Since the surviving husband's position is in a general
sense that of a trustee accountable for his management of the community," there would seem to be no essential conflict between his
position as personal representative and his position as surviving
spouse. However, the surviving husband has broad powers of
management conferred upon him by Prob. C. 202 and 203, while
the executor or administrator has no such inherent power. The
latter are strictly limited by statute or by the will and may not engage
in certain transactions without prior court approval or subsequent
court confirmation.49 Following sections will consider the impact of
the husband's dual role in specific areas of administration.
Marshalingthe Assets and Filing the Inventory and Appraisement
Although section 571 of the Probate Code imposes upon the
executor or administrator the duty to take into his possession all
of the estate of the decedent, it is apparent that he is not entitled
to possession of any of the community assets, unless possibly he
can show immediate possession is necessary to carry out provisions
of the decedent's will.5" If the surviving husband is also the personal
representative, his possession in either role would seem to satisfy
Prob. C. 571.
Under section 600 of the Probate Code the executor or administrator must file an inventory and appraisement of the estate
of the decedent "which has come to his possession or knowledge."
He could properly include assets in the husband's possession, if he
had knowledge of them. However, he would be well advised to
require the surviving husband to submit a separate inventory of the
community assets on a form similar to the one prescribed by Prob.
C. 600 which includes an oath similar to that required of the
personal representative. This document should be attached as an
exhibit to the executor's or administrator's inventory and appraisement, which under Prob. C. 600 must be all inclusive. The Knego
decision provides ample authority for such a procedure,"' and in
any event section 615 of the Probate Code is available for this
46 Larrabee v. Tracy, 21 Cal. 2d 645, 134 P.2d 265 (1943); Estate of Boggs, 19
Cal. 2d 324, 121 P.2d 678 (1942).
47 Los Angeles v. Morrison, 15 Cal. 2d 368, 101 P.2d 470 (1940) ; Estate of Knox,
52 Cal. App. 2d 338, 126 P.2d 108 (1942).
48 Knego v. Grover, 208 Cal. App. 2d 134, 25 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1962).
49 See generally, 4 WiTKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate
§ 208-218.
50 Maekeig v. United Security Bank and Trust Company, 112 Cal. App. 138, 296
Pac. 673 (1931).
51 Knego v. Grover, 208 Cal. App. 2d 134, 25 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1962).
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purpose. Under this section, upon a complaint under oath by the
executor or administrator, the court may cite any person "entrusted
with any part of the estate of the decedent" to render a full account
under oath of any such property. The surviving husband is such a
person. If he refuses to co-operate, both Prob. C. 614 and 615 are
available to convince him, since under the former section the
alternative to compliance is commitment to the county jail. It would
appear that the same sections could be employed if the surviving
husband did not allow the personal representative and the appraiser
a reasonable right of inspection and investigation.
In preparing the inventory the executor or administrator must
attempt to ascertain what portion of the estate is community prop2
erty and which is separate property of the decedent. This, of
8
course, is only his opinion at the time the inventory is prepared.
However, if the surviving husband is also the representative, he must
express an opinion and include assets in the inventory either as his
wife's separate property or as community property. If he does so,
is he estopped from later asserting a conflicting claim as to the nature
54
of such assets? The decision in Estate of Kelpsch indicated that
the surviving husband should not be estopped from asserting a community interest in assets which he as executor listed in the inventory
of his wife's estate, in view of their clear designation therein as community property. In an earlier decision" the surviving wife made a
sworn statement to an inventory, prepared by her as representative,
that certain assets were separate property of her husband. The
court held that this was a declaration against interest and admissable
in later proceedings in which she contended the same assets were
5
community property. In another case on similar facts, " the surviving wife-executrix was not estopped from asserting her claim
where the inventory had been erroneously prepared by her attorneys and their error was called to the attention of the probate
court. It would certainly seem that a statement of opinion under these
circumstances should not give rise to estoppel, although it might
constitute material evidence.
It is clear that although declarations in an inventory as to the
nature and extent of the estate are not final, any controversies
should be resolved as soon as possible. This protects both the
estate and the surviving husband, whether or not he is the personal
representative. Despite the power of the representative to require
52 CAL. PROB. CODE

§ 601.

53 1 CONDEE, op. cit. supra note 10; § 341.

54 203 Cal. 613, 265 Pac. 214 (1928).
55 Estate of Hill, 167 Cal. 59, 138 Pac. 690 (1914).
56 Steere v. Barnet, 54 Cal. App. 589, 202 Pac. 166 (1921).
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an accounting from the husband, it might be difficult to obtain the
necessary information if the husband decided certain assets were
his separate property and simply excluded them from his accounting.
It has been held that proceedings under Prob. C. 613, 614, and 615
are in the nature of bills of discovery to aid executors in locating
and inventorying assets of an estate. Such proceedings are not appealable and thus do not constitute an adjudication of title to the
assets involved. Any person cited under any of these sections may
demand that his claim of title be adjudicated by a court of competent
jurisdiction.5 7 It would appear that the surviving husband could be
required to account for all property in his possession or control,
whether or not he contended it was his separate property or community, thereby furnishing the representative with all necessary
information to determine the interests of the estate.
Assuming conflicting claims of title between the surviving
husband and the estate, does a probate court have jurisdiction to
adjudicate such claim and determine title to property? The decision
of the California Supreme Court in Central Bank v. Superior Court5"
contains a comprehensive discussion of this issue, which may be
summarized as follows:
1. As a general proposition a probate court cannot decide a
disputed claim between an estate and a stranger.59
2. However, the probate court will adjudicate such claims if
the claimant is not a stranger to the probate proceeding and is in
privity with the estate. °
3. The most common example of a claimant who is in privity
with the estate is the executor or administrator, including a surviving spouse who is also the personal representative."'
4. This rule has not been extended to include a surviving
spouse who is not also the representative of the estate, even if such
spouse is also the heir of the estate as to assets other than those in
which he claims ownership. 2
57 Estate of Schechtman, 45 Cal. 2d 50, 286 P.2d 345 (1955).
58 45 Cal. 2d 10, 285 P.2d 906 (1955).
59 Citing S~hlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal. 2d 361, 273 P.2d 897 (1954); Estate of
Dabney, 37 Cal.-2d 672, 234 P.2d 962 (1951).
60 Citing Schlyen v. Schlyen, supra note 59; Stevens v. Superior Court, 155 Cal.
148, 99 Pac. 512 (1909).
61 Citing Schlyen v. Schlyen, supra note 59; Estate of Roach, 208 Cal. 394, 281
Pac. 607 (1929) ; Bauer v. Bauer, 201 Cal. 267, 256 Pac. 820 (1927) ; Estate of Fulton,
188 Cal. 489, 205 Pac. 681 (1922); Estate of Klumpke, 167 Cal. 415, 139 Pac. 1062
(1914) ; Stevens v. Superior Court, supra note 60.
62 Citing Estate of Niccols, 164 Cal. 368, 129 Pac. 278 (1912) ; Merola v. Superior
Court, 125 Cal. App. 2d 1, 269 P.2d 664 (1954); Wilson v. Superior Court, 101 Cal.
App. 2d 592, 225 P.2d 1001 (1951); Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal. App. 2d 681, 189 P.2d 528
(1948).
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5. The claim of a surviving husband to his share of the community is adverse to the estate, since the property does not pass
through the probate proceeding. 3
6. The power of the probate court ends with discovery of the
property, and title to property should be determined in an appropriate action upon issues framed for that purpose."
In the later decision of Woods v. Security-First National
Bank,65 probate court jurisdiction was extended to a situation in
which a surviving husband filed a petition to determine heirship,
contending that the will was invalid as to him because it was
executed prior to marriage, and later contended that certain assets
held by the executor were community property and not the separate
property of his deceased spouse. The court expressly disapproved
anything to the contrary in the oft-cited decision of Estate of
Kurt,66 which had held that the probate court had no such jurisdiction. However, still a later case held that the Woods rationale should
be applied only when the husband first claimed as an heir, bringing
him into privity with the estate, and subsequently claimed a community interest. It held that the Kurt decision was fully applicable
to situations in which the basis of such a petition is the claim of a
community interest. 67 It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the
claims of community interest by the surviving husband cannot be
determined in the probate proceeding unless he is also the personal
representative, or unless he otherwise is in privity with the estate.
Powers of Management
An executor or administrator is severly limited by the provisions of the will or the probate court in his management of the
estate, including the making of investments, performance of
decedent's contracts, carrying on the decedent's business, entering
into new contracts, borrowing money, and encumbering estate
assets. On the other hand, the surviving husband has broad powers
under the provisions of Prob. C. 202 and 203. There is apparently
no way the representative of the estate or the probate court can
63 Citing Makeig v. United Security Bank and Trust Company, 112 Cal. App.
138, 296 Pac. 673 (1931); Estate of Klumpke, 167 Cal. 415, 139 Pac. 1062 (1914);
Estate of Kurt, supra note 62; Estate of King, 19 Cal. 2d 354, 121 P.2d 716 (1942).
64 Citing Ex Parte Casey, 71 Cal. 269, 12 Pac. 118 (1886); Merola v. Superior
Court, 125 Cal. App. 2d 1, 269 P.2d 664 (1954); Wilson v. Superior Court, 101 Cal.
App. 2d 592, 225 P.2d 1001 (1951) ; McCarthy v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. App. 2d 468,
149 P.2d 55 (1944).
65 46 Cal. 2d 697, 299 P.2d 657 (1956).
66 83 Cal. App. 2d 681, 189 P.2d 528 (1948).
67 Estate of Stone, 170 Cal. App. 2d 533, 339 P.2d 220 (1959).
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directly control the management activities of the surviving husband
or require him to obtain court approval for his activities. Even the
Knego decision, while imposing limitations upon the surviving
husband, granted that he had the power to encumber community
real property without probate court approval.68 Conversely, the
dominion of the surviving husband should preclude the estate or
the court from exercising any form of management power over the
community assets, even if such power is granted by the will of the
deceased wife or would be in the best interests of the estate. If continued management by the husband threatens the estate, apparently
the only remedy available to the estate would be the one already
suggested, i.e., the estate's interest in the assets be turned over to
the representative to carry the wife's will into effect.
The appointment of the surviving husband as executor or
administrator results in a basic conflict in this area which the author
is unable to resolve. If the husband comes within probate jurisdiction so that his management powers are no greater than those of an
executor or administrator, his position is impossible. He would in
effect be a tenant in common with himself. But it is said that an
executor or administrator cannot be interested in the purchase of
0
estate property, 9 occupy estate property without trying to rent it,7
72
use estate funds, 71 carry on the estate business without authority,
and enter into new contracts binding the estate. 7' Fortunately, a
representative is not liable for commingling unless he uses the funds
for his own purposes. 74 A reasonable interpretation would be that
the husband is managing the community in his capacity as a surviving husband under Prob. C. 202 and 203, but handling strictly
estate matters in his capacity as representative of the estate. 75
This is not a perfect solution, but it may be the only one possible. In situations where this could lead to difficulties, the best
protection available to the surviving husband would be to petition
for instructions under Prob. C. 588, asking the court to delineate
his rights, duties, and responsibilities.
Knego v. Grover, 208 Cal. App. 134, 148, 25 Cal. Rptr. 158, 167 (1962).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 583.
Estate of Pardue, 57 Cal. App. 2d 918, 135 P.2d 394 (1943).
Estate of McSweeney, 123 Cal. App. 2d 787, 268 P.2d 107 (1954).
Estate of McPhee, 156 Cal. 335, 104 Pac. 455 (1909); In re Rose's Estate, 80
Cal. 166, 22 Pac. 86 (1889).
73 Moss v. Boyle, 44 Cal. App. 2d 410, 112 P.2d 657 (1941).
74 Estate of Burnett, 42 Cal. App. 2d 427, 109 P.2d 26 (1941).
75 See for example, Estate of McKenzie, 199 Cal. App. 2d 393, 18 Cal. Rptr. 680
(1962). The surviving husband, who was also the personal representative, continued
operating a ranch which was community property. The Court indicated that his
authority to manage the business was based upon his status of surviving husband
under Cal. Prob. Code § 202, but that he should account therefor as the personal representative of the estate.
68
69
70
71
72
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Sales of Property
Sections 750-814 of the Probate Code set out the circumstances
under which estate assets may be sold, and the procedure to be
followed in such sales. Since the personal representative has no
inherent power, he will be limited to the circumstances set out in the
Code, unless the will grants him a power of sale. Even then a sale
is subject to confirmation by the court."6 It is clear that the power
of sale of the surviving husband under Prob. C. 202 and 203 is
absolute and unconditional. Again we are faced with the problem of
the surviving husband who is also the personal representative, and
the comments made above with reference to powers of management under such circumstances are equally applicable here. Since
the matter of selling estate assets is subject to so many limitations,
it seems the surviving husband who is also the representative would
be well advised to protect himself by asking for instructions when
such sales are contemplated.
One possible area of difficulty would be sales in which the
wife's consent would have been required during her lifetime. Prob.
C. 202 grants the husband power to sell personal property, but also
refers to the power to deal with community personal property as he
had during the lifetime of his wife. Civil Code 172 requires during
the wife's lifetime her consent to any transfers not for valuable consideration or any sales of furniture, wearing apparel, and similar
assets. Would the estate succeed to this right of consent? Under the
authority of C.C. 172, the Knego decision held that the husband
could not give away estate assets after the death of his wife, and this
argument might be extended to cover sales of personal chattels. It
would seem that the purpose of C.C. 172's limitations on sale of
personal assets is to protect the wife's right of enjoyment during her
life, and that the section has no application after her death. In most
cases this would not be an important matter unless personal assets
have a high value, as in the case of antique furniture, fur coats, or
jewelry.
Unless an appropriate forty day notice is recorded, Prob. C.
203 grants the husband the power of sale over realty. This section
makes no reference to a limitation on his power because the wife's
consent to a transfer would have been required during her lifetime
by C.C. 172a. Again referring to the Knego decision the court held
that the right of the surviving husband to execute a deed of trust
on community realty, absent the forty day notice, was not questioned. In view of the fact that the wife's consent would have been
required by C.C. 172a for any deed, mortgage, or encumbrance, it
76 CAL. PROB. CODE

§ 754, §§ 757-58.
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is clear that the court did not believe her estate succeeded to any
such right of consent.
It has been the experience of the author that some title companies refuse to recognize the power of sale of the surviving husband
and will not insure title without a probate court order confirming
the sale as to the estate's interest. Their main authorities for this
position apparently are title company manuals, which this author
refuses to accept as authority for any proposition. Additionally they
argue that confirmation by the probate court is some form of substitute for the wife's lifetime power of consent. Even assuming the
power of consent did pass to the estate, confirmation of sales under
Prob. C. 784 and 785 is not equivalent to the consent power of a
living wife, particularly in view of the power of the probate court
to accept higher bids under Prob. C. 785. It is submitted that title
companies following this view have no basis for it, even in their most
cited authority on real property law and title practice.77
The Knego decision indicated that the proceeds of a loan
obtained by encumbering community real property are community
insofar as the interest of the estate is concerned. The same rule
should logically follow as to the proceeds of a sale of community
assets. As that decision further indicates, sales, encumbrances and
transfers by the surviving husband may change the nature of the
community from real property to personal property, or vice-versa,
in which case his management and control might vary to some
degree under Prob. C. 202 or 203.
It is clear that the representative of the estate cannot have any
power of sale over community assets which are under the management and control of the surviving husband. However, if such a sale
were necessary under Prob. C. 754 to pay debts, legacies, family
allowance, or expenses, it would be necessary to make the sale to
carry the wife's will into effect. In such a case the husband could be
required to transfer community assets to the estate to be sold for
such purposes. More questionable would be the right of the
representative to take such action under Prob. C. 754 when the sale
is for the "advantage, benefit, and best interests of the estate, and
those interested therein. . .

."

Depending on the facts in each situa-

tion, it might be a great deal more difficult to show that a transfer of
community assets to the personal representative for an advantageous
or beneficial sale is necessary to carry out the pro.visions of the
wife's will.
When a forty day notice has been recorded, it would appear
77 See OGDEN'S, CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY LAW

§ 19.9 (1956).
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that the estate representative obtains a power to sell community
real property under Prob. C. 754. If the recording of the notice
divests the husband of his power of sale, it would be unreasonable to
conclude no one has the power to sell the wife's interest in the realty.
This property is generally subject to administration, except in
situations where the husband retains powers under Prob. C. 202
and 203. Not so clear is the status of the power of sale during the
first forty days after the wife's death.
Debts and Expenses of Administration
Under the clear wording of Prob. C. 202, the entire community
passing from the control of the husband by reason of his death or
the wife's testamentary disposition is subject to his debts and
expenses of administration. Whether husband or wife dies first, the
interest of the wife in the community is subject to no more than
one-half of the total indebtedness. 71 If the husband dies first, it has
been held that the provisions of his will may exonerate the community interest of the survivor from such debts either by express
provision or by a general statement that all debts are to be paid out
of "my estate," which means that estate over which the husband
had testamentary control. 79 It is not entirely clear that the same
rationale could be applied in the case of the wife's prior death, since
she would be exonerating the husband's share of the community
from his debts. This would in effect be a testamentary gift to the
husband, and the courts would undoubtedly require a clear statement
of such purpose in the will before reaching such a conclusion.
Obviously a reference by a wife to "my debts" could not be construed as including the debts of the husband.
Since California does not recognize, at least in modern times,
the concept of community debts,"° the phrase "husband's debts" is
interpreted as including all debts incurred by the husband on behalf
of the community, as well as the separate debts of the husband."'
Although there was some early confusion in the matter,8 2 it is now
clear that such debts include medical and funeral expenses for the
wife incurred by the husband.8 However, even though the husband
is liable for such expenses, the estate of the wife is primarily liable
for them. 4 If the husband pays the expenses of the last illness and
78 Odone v. Marzocchi, 34 Cal. 2d 431, 211 P.2d 297 (1949).

79 In re Marino's Estate, 39 Cal. App. 2d 1,102 P.2d 443 (1940).
80 10 CAL. JUR. 2d, Community Property § 88.

81 Grolernund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 111 P.2d 641 (1941).
82 Estate of Weringer, 100 Cal. 345, 34 Pac. 825 (1893) ; Brezzo v. Brangero, 51
Cal. App. 79, 196 Pac. 87 (1921).
83 Odone v. Marzocchi, 34 Cal. 2d 431, 211 P.2d 297 (1949).
84 CAL. PROB. CODE § 951.1; § 950; In re Dennis' Estate, 110 Cal. App. 2d 667,
243 P.2d 579 (1952).
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funeral, he should be entitled to charge the entire amount against
the share of the community over which the wife has exercised testamentary power, or seek reimbursement from separate property held
by her estate, or both.85 It would seem equitable that the total
amount of such expenses be prorated between her separate property
and her entire interest in the community, so that in the event she
does not dispose of her entire interest in the community, the part
passing to her husband would be equitably charged with a portion
of such costs.
The failure to distinguish between separate debts of the
husband and so-called community debts presents an interesting
problem when the husband has separate property. The cases are
clear that when the husband dies first his debts must be prorated
between the community property and his separate property on the
basis of value.8" However, the author knows of no case in which
the same issue was raised when the wife died first. On one hand,
Prob. C. 202 clearly subjects the community to the husband's debts,
and thus during the lifetime of his wife the husband may use community funds to discharge his separate obligations without resorting
to his separate funds.8 7 On the other hand, the concept of proration
of debts between separate and community property upon the
husband's death is based upon equitable principles,88 and application
of this principle when the wife dies first is undoubtedly equitable.
In one of the cases involving the death of a husband, a court intimated that upon proper facts it would be necessary to consider
whether debts incurred by the husband prior to marriage or on his
separate account after marriage should be properly charged to his
separate property.8" The author predicts that should such a case
arise, the courts may well segregate such "separate" debts of the
husband and charge them against his separate property, or in the
alternative prorate all of the husband's debts between his separate
property and the community property.
The procedure for the presentation and payment of claims of
the creditors of the decedent, as set out in sections 700-739 of the
Probate Code, should not apply to creditors of the husband, regardless of how their claims arose. To require such presentation for
payment would not only be contrary to the surviving husband's
85 In re Hincheon's Estate, 159 Cal. 755, 116 Pac. 47 (1911). In re Kemmerrer,
114 Cal. App. 2d 810, 251 P.2d 345 (1952).
86 Estate of Hirsh, 122 Cal. App. 2d 822, 265 P.2d 920 (1954) ; Estate of Haselbud, 26 Cal. App. 2d 375, 79 P.2d 443 (1938).
87 Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 111 P.2d 641 (1941).
88 Estate of Haselbud, 26 Cal. App. 2d 375, 79 P.2d 443 (1938).
89 Ibid.
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management and control, but would also require a distinction to be
made between those debts which pertain to the husband separately
and those which arose from community transactions. In addition the
period of limitations on such claims provided by Prob. C. 708 could
hardly be applicable. In any event, the wife's separate estate is not
liable for the debts of the husband.9 0 This raises the possibility that
the interest of the wife in the comunity could be distributed in
probate subject to debts and obligations, unless the husband has an
affirmative duty to discharge and settle all of his obligations during
the period of probate administration. The court suggested this might
be necessary in Johnston v. San Francisco Savings Union." In the
Knego decision the court held that the surviving husband could not
be required to pay the estate an amount equal to an outstanding
encumbrance against community real property, since this would
result in double recovery to the estate. But the court did not
specifically discuss the question of whether the husband had an
affirmative duty to settle his debts. Nevertheless, the net effect of
the decision was that the realty in question passed to the estate subject to an encumbrance. If the award of a portion of community
property to the wife upon divorce is analagous, the estate would take
such property subject to all its burdens, including the husband's separate debts incurred prior to death, regardless of whether they were
reduced to judgment. 2 In the divorce situation, it may be possible
for the wife to marshal assets and require the creditors to look first
to the husband for payment," but it is not clear the same doctrine
would be extended to the probate situation. There seems to be no
way to afford the estate complete protection or isolation from such
liability. Even if it should be held the husband has an affirmative
duty to settle these debts, or that he is primarily liable on any debts
he does not settle, the interest passing to the estate would of
necessity remain subject to them, otherwise the interests of creditors
would be prejudiced. There is a definite need for statutory clarification in this area.
Is the wife's interest in the community subject to her separate
debts? It would not be during her lifetime. The wording of Prob. C.
202 would suggest that it is not subject to her separate debts after
her death, where she does not dispose of any part of it by her will.
90 CAL. CIv. CODE § 171. Of course, the wife's separate property would be liable
for certain necessaries under the section.
91 75 Cal. 134, 16 Pac. 753 (1888).
92 Bank of America v. Mantz, 4 Cal. 2d 322, 49 P.2d 279 (1935); Mayberry v.
Whittier, 144 Cal. 322, 78 Pac. 16 (1904) ; Frankel v. Boyd, 106 Cal. 608, 39 Pac. 939
(1895) ; Vest v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 2d 91, 294 P.2d 988 (1956).
93 Bank of America v. Mantz, supra note 92; Mayberry v. Whittier, supra note
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It should be mentioned that the 1850 statute expressly made the
interest of each spouse passing to his or her heirs after death subject
to the debts of that spouse.9 4 This provision was deleted by the 1863
statute95 and has never been reinstated. This has led one author to
suggest that the wife's share of the community might not be subject
to her separate debts, even if she exercises her power of testamentary
disposition over it.9" He suggests that the testamentary power of the
wife is essentially a statutory general power of appointment, and that
upon exercise of the power, the creditors of the wife could reach the
appointed assets. 7 Stated more particularly in terms of future
interest law, this would mean that the wife has a general testamentary
power of appointment over her interest in estate assets, which assets
pass to her husband in default of appointment. In the event she
exercises her power, the assets are "captured" by her estate and
become subject to the claims of her creditors.9 8 This analogy is essentially sound, much more so than any concept that the wife can
make a testamentary disposition of her interest in the community to
the prejudice of her creditors.
In the portion of the Makeig decision quoted above99 the court
specifically stated that the interest in the community over which the
deceased wife exercised testamentary power should be available
to her personal representative to pay her debts. This was considered
by the court necessary to carry her will into effect. Therefore, either
on the authority of the Makeig decision or by analogy to general
testamentary powers of appointment, it seems that the part of the
community over which the wife exercises her testamentary power
will be subject to her separate debts.
When the husband dies first, the entire community is subject to
his debts, family allowance, and expenses of administration. The
wording of Prob. C. 202 indicates that, when the wife dies first, only
that portion of the community over which she exercises her testamentary power is subject to administration. Thus such costs should
be charged only against the assets so disposed of by her will.100
Statutory fees of representatives and attorneys are predicated on the
value of the property actually administered and which must come
under the control and possession of the personal representative to
Cal. Stats. 1850, ch. 103, p. 225, § 11.
95 Cal. Stats. 1861, ch. 323, pp. 310, 311, § 1; Cal. Stats. 1863-64, ch. 333, p. 363,
§ 1; CAL. CIv. CODE (1872) § 1401 amended Code. Am. 1873-74, ch. 612, p. 238, § 181.
96 VERRALL, op. cit. supra note 40, at 289.
97 Ibid.
98 See generally, SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 63 (1951).
99 See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
100 Makeig v. United Security Bank and Trust Company, 112 Cal. App. 138, 296
Pac. 673 (1931).
94
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be accounted for by him.'' When the husband dies first, the fees are
chargeable against the entire community, since administration,
control and possession pertains to all of it; 0.2 but when the wife dies
first, the fees should be chargeable only against that part of the
community over which she exercises testamentary power, since the
balance of the community never comes within the representative's
possession and control. 0 3
As the Knego decision indicates, the husband may incur expenses for the preservation, maintenance, and protection of the
community, which will be allowed as a charge against the entire
community. 10 4 Could the personal representative also incur expenses
for the protection of the entire community and, if so, could they be
charged against both the estate's share and the husband's share?
Prob. C. 202 seems to foreclose such a possibility. It would seem,
however, that where an emergency arises and the representative
must protect the estate's interest in the community, the courts will
find a way to allow expenditures so incurred and charge the husband
accordingly.
The husband's share of the community is not includable 10in5
the wife's estate either for California Inheritance Tax purposes
or for Federal Estate Tax purposes. 0 6
If the wife disposes of her entire interest in the community, it
is clear that these taxes will be charged against assets so passing. If
the wife does not dispose of her entire interest in the community,
may the portion retained by the surviving husband under Prob. C.
201 be similarly taxed? As has been noted, it seems that since 1927
the surviving husband takes the wife's interest in the community
only by reason of descent or succession, and he should be chargeable
with any death taxes properly allocable to any part of the wife's
interest in the community passing to him. Such an interest is exempt
8
from California inheritance tax' but not from federal estate tax.
The liability of the surviving husband should be based upon the
value of what he receives compared to the value of all taxable
101 CAL. PROB. CODE § 901.
102

Estate of Phillips, 123 Cal. App. 2d 570, 266 P.2d 854 (1954).

103 CAL. PROB. CODE § 920; Estate of Boggs, 33 Cal. App. 2d 30, 90 P.2d 814
(1939); CAL. EST. ADMIN. (Cont. Ed. Bar) § 38.11 (1959).
104 Knego v. Grover, 208 Cal. App. 2d 134, 25 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1962).
105 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 13551. See also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 13553,
repeated Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 2189, p. 4530, § 2.5.
106 See generally, COMMERCE CLEARING HousE, FED. EST. & GiPe TAX REP. § 1310
(1961).
107 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 13551.
108 INT.REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2033.
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transfers in the estate, even though the interest he receives is outside of probate.10 9
Accounting and Distribution
The surviving husband is clearly accountable for his management of the deceased wife's interest in the community. In such
accounting he is chargeable with all community assets over which
his wife exercised testamentary power and any of their income. He
is entitled to credit for any expenses or costs incurred in the preservation and maintenance of those assets and of course for the total
amount transferred to the personal representative to carry the wife's
will into effect."' He is also accountable for any sales, proceeds of
loans, or other changes in the nature of the assets."' Vouchers may
be required at the discretion of the court." 2 Since the personal
representative is not chargeable for any transactions which occurred
prior to the time such assets are transferred to him, the husband's
accounting and the estate accounting are completely separate, and
both should be filed with the court. If the husband refuses to file
such an accounting, Prob. C. 615 can be used to force compliance.
In many situations the community assets will not be transferred
to the personal representative until time for distribution, when
definitely needed to carry the wife's will into effect. The author foresees many problems with regard to distribution, but space does not
permit an extended discussion of them. For example, suppose the
wife dies leaving her interest in Blackacre, a community asset, to her
Aunt Mathilda and the balance of her interest in the community
to her daughter. Her surviving husband who does not like Aunt
Mathilda but does like the daughter, sells Blackacre and uses the
proceeds of the sale to pay all of his debts. It appears that since
this was done after the death of the wife by the husband, who is a
fiduciary, the probate court would have authority to adjust this
situation under the general rules relating to order of resort and
abatement."' In fact the probate court should have sufficient authority to make such adjustments any time the husband's management is contrary to the testatrix's intention or the general law relating to payment of legacies, but only at such time as possession and
control of the assets are transferred to the personal representative.
109 CAL. PROB. CODE § 970-72, 976-77(a) ; Estate of Miller, 154 Cal. App. 2d 544,
299 P.2d 1005 (1956).
11o Knego v. Grover, 208 Cal. App. 2d 134, 25 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1962).
111 Ibid.
112 Estate of McKenzie, 199 Cal. App. 2d 393, 18 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1962).
113 CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 750-54. See generally, 4 WITKIN, op. cit. supra note 49,
§ 272.
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Problems would also arise if the wife's will disposed of less
than her entire interest in the community and the assets so disposed
of were chargeable with debts, expenses of administration, or taxes.
Would the husband be required to transfer only the assets disposed
of, or would he also be required to transfer additional community
assets sufficient to liquidate such costs? The answer would depend
on the intention of the testatrix. If her will indicates that the legacies
in question are to be exonerated, this may be an implied testamentary
disposition of additional community assets necessary to exonerate
the gift by payment of costs. If she exonerates by providing that all
such costs will be paid from the residue of her estate, or fails to
exonerate, and she has not brought the balance of her community
interest into the residue, the costs will in effect be borne by her sep4
arate property in the residue or by the legatees."
CONCLUSION

The suppositions and analogies which the author has frequently
resorted to in this article are required by the unique concept of dual
management and administration which apparently is novel in the
law. In this situation, the law tells us what must be done without
telling us how to do it. It may be that future legislation or case
decisions will eventually clarify these matters and provide more
definite guidelines in the practical problems of administration encountered under these circumstances. Until that happens, it may be
that all we can do is hope that the husband dies first.
114 Ibid.

